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REGULATING MINORS' ACCESS TO
PORNOGRAPHY VIA THE INTERNET:
WHAT OPTIONS DO CONGRESS
HAVE LEFT?
I.

INTRODUCTION

The extent of the Internet's quiet takeover of contemporary society1
is outweighed only by the sheer vastness 2 of the thing itself. In fact, to
refer to the Internet as a thing is to misspeak; the Internet is much more,
it is a life in being, 3 endowed by its creators 4 with the vnique ability to
spread information at the speed of light connecting millions around the
globe in search of technologically enhanced enlightenment. 5 As with
most innovations that have world-altering capabilities, 6 the Internet is
not without its very own dark side.
1. See Nua Internet Services: Global Net Population Increases (available at http:l/
www.nua.com/surveys/index.cgi?f=vs&art~id=905358729&rel=true) (accessed Oct. 1, 2004)
(stating, as of February 25, 2003, approximately 580 million people worldwide have access
to the Internet in some form. The United States alone accounts for twenty-nine (29) percent of world-wide consumption); see also, Measuring the Internet Economy (available at
http://www.internetindicators.com/jan-2001.pdf) (accessed Oct. 1, 2004) (estimating the Internet Economy in 1998 to be valued at 301 billion dollars per year, and accounting for over
1.2 million jobs).
2. Id.
3. Id. Not only is the Internet already massive in both number of users and information stored, it is also growing at an exponential rate. Some hypothesize that at the current
rate of growth a crash of the entire system is imminent.
4. See Reno v. Am. Civil Lib. Union, 521 U.S. 844, 849-850 (1997) ("The Internet is an
international network of interconnected computers. It is the outgrowth of what began in
1969 as a military program called ARPANET which was designed to enable computers
operated by the military, defense contractors, and universities conducting defense-related
research to communicate with one another by redundant channels even if some portions of
the network were damaged in a war").
5. See, Making CBS Play Fair, U.S. News & World Report, Vol. 137, No. 11, 55 (Oct. 4,
2004) (recounting the emergence of"bloggers" and their role in disproving the reliability of
certain documents used by the television program "60 Minutes II" as proof for a story).
6. The development of nuclear energy brought both positives and negatives; i.e. nuclear power plants and the hydrogen bomb, for instance; see also Russell B. Weeks, CyberZoning a Mature Domain: The Solution to Preventing Inadvertent Access to Sexually Explicit Content on the Internet?, 8 Va. J. L. & Tech. 4, 1 (2003) (arguing that the Internet is
the greatest invention since the advent of electricity. "The Internet is the printing press,
radio, television, telephone, and more rolled up into one").
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The Internet's ugly little sisters are the thousands of Web sites de7
voted to the procurement and dissemination of pornographic material.
s
9
The Internet has a Red-Light District that would make Caligula blush;
the citizens of Sodom and Gomorrah' would be proud of much of what is
now available at the click of a button." That being said, living in free
society entitles people to have access to such material if they so desire.
There will be no argument to the contrary herein. However, there is not
only a great need, but an uncompromisable duty to protect minors from,
and prevent access to, this potentially harmful imagery.
Exposure to pornography at young, impressionable ages is virtually
universally understood to be detrimental. 12 Studies have shown that
pornographic stimulation has a negative impact similar to that of being
exposed to extreme violence at such tender years. 13 Furthermore, pornography walks hand in hand with the objectification of women perpetuating the misogynistic role of the male as the dominant master of the
sexual domain. 14 Considering that pornography perpetuates detrimen7. Am. Lib. Assn. v. U.S., 201 F.Supp.2d 401, 406 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
8. See Emily Vander Wilt, ConsideringCopa: A Look at Congress's Second Attempt to
Regulate Indecency on the Internet, 11 Va. J. Soc. Policy & L. 373, n. 10 (2004) (detailing
estimations of an 1,800 percent increase in the number of pornographic Web sites on the
Internet from 1998 - 2003, bringing the total number of pornographic web pages to somewhere in the neighborhood of 260 to 372 million).
9. Garrett Fagan, The Online Encyclopedia of Roman Emperors, Pennsylvania State
University http://www.roman-emperors.org/gaius.htm) (accessed Nov. 2, 2004). Caligula
was also known by his proper name Gaius Caesar Augustus Germanicus (Caligula was his
nickname). Id. Caligula is remembered for his cruelty and immoral sexual affairs. Id. It is
believed that Caligula was fond of having incestuous relations with his sisters. Caligula
even named a horse to the Roman Senate. Id.
10. Holy Bible, New International Version, Genesis, 19:24-25 (Zondervan 1994) (stating God rained sulfur on the two cities destroying the wickedness that dwelled within including all those living in the cities and all the vegetation surrounding them).
11. In an experiment, the author accessed http://www.google.com (a popular "search
engine") and ran several searches with respect to pornography. With each search the author was able to access commercial Web sites that depicted graphic sexual acts; see also
Mitchell P. Goldstein, Congress and the Courts Battle Over the FirstAmendment: Can the
Law Really ProtectChildren From Pornographyon the Internet?, 21 John Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 141, n. 13 (2003) (detailing extensively the ability to easily access pornographic material on the Internet both deliberately as well as inadvertently).
12. See generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography,Civil Rights, and Speech, 20
Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Libs. L. Rev. 1 (1985) (detailing a common understanding of pornography creating negative perspectives of the roles of adults engaging in sexual intercourse,
as well as the harm caused to women as they are objectified in the process).
13. See Richard B. Felson, Mass Media Effects on Violent Behovior, Annual Review of
Sociology, Vol. 22, pp. 103-128 (1996) (asserting that the results of some studies have
shown that the effect of viewing pornography increases the likelihood that one will become
violent more easily if provoked).
14. MacKinnon, supra n. 12, at 17-18. "The content of pornography is one thing.
There, women substantively desire dispossession and cruelty .... What pornography does
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tal images and stereotypes bastardizing the sexual relationship of men
and women, Congress has a very compelling interest in preventing mi15
nors from such access to pornography.
6
This Comment will discuss several recent attempts by Congress' to
regulate the accessibility of pornography to minors via the Internet. Specifically: 1. The Communications Decency Act 1 7 ("CDA"); 2. The Child
Online Protection Act' 8 ("COPA"); and 3. The Child Internet Protection
Act 19 ("CIPA"). Unfortunately Congress has been successful in enacting
legislation capable of withstanding scrutiny under the First Amendment 20 of the Constitution in only one of the above listed Acts, CIPA.2 1
With respect to the CDA and COPA, Congress has not been so successful. 22 In fact, what is most striking from the Supreme Court's decisions with respect to the CDA and COPA is that Congress specifically
tailored the language of COPA to the Constitutional concerns that the
Supreme Court had with the CDA. 23 Logic would tend to indicate that if
Congress expressly addressed each concern the Supreme Court had with
respect to the CDA's constitutional validity when drafting COPA - tailoring each aspect therein to each concern - COPA would not fail to surpass
Constitutional scrutiny. This however, as will be discussed below, was
goes beyond its content: It eroticizes hierarchy, it sexualizes inequality. It makes dominance and submission sex." Id. ; see also The Dangers of Pornography?, A Review of the
Effects Literature, http://www.asc.upenn.edu/usr/chunter/porn effects.html#women (accessed Sept. 28, 2004) (stating that studies have shown that those exposed to high volumes
of pornography are more likely to give lower sentences to criminals found guilty of rape).
15. See Amy Harmon, ForParents,a New and Vexing Burden, N.Y. Times, A21 (June
27, 1997) (reporting that of the thirty percent of Internet users that access pornography,
eight percent are under seventeen years old).
16. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, What if I want My Kids to Watch Pornography?:Protecting
Children from Indecent "Speech", 11 Win. & Mary Bill Rights J. 671, 671-672 (2003) (detailing a multitude of Congress' other recent attempts at regulating other forms of indecent
speech over various media, including, but not limited to, restrictions on telephone services,
radio and television broadcasts, and cable television broadcasts).
17. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2005).
18. 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2005).
19. 20 U.S.C.S § 9134 (2005).
20. U.S. Const. amend. I. (stating "Congress shall make no law ...abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ...).
21. See U.S. v. Am. Lib. Assn., Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 214 (2003) (holding that CIPA is a
valid exercise of the spending power of Congress, and, since it does not induce libraries to
violate the First Amendment, it is Constitutional).
22. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 877-878 (holding the CDA unconstitutional because its provisions were not narrowly tailored enough to satisfy strict scrutiny under the First Amendment); see also Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Lib. Union, 124 S.Ct. 2783, 2795 (2004) [hereinafter
"Ashcroft I"] (holding that although COPA was not unconstitutional on its face, it was not
the least restrictive means of producing the results Congress intended).
23. Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Lib. Union, 535 U.S. 564, 569-570 (2002) [hereinafter "Ashcroft 1"].
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not the case. As a result, Congress is essentially hanging in Limbo with
respect to its ability to regulate Internet pornography and its subsequent
availability to minors via the Internet.
This predicament strikes as odd considering the Supreme Court has
upheld other such age restrictive legislation. 24 Thus, it begs the question: Why has Congress been effectively unable to similarly regulate the
Internet?
Part II of this Comment will discuss the background and reasoning
of the cases dealing with CIPA, the CDA and COPA respectively. The
discussion of the decisions and the statutes will reveal that the Supreme
Court has left little, if any, room to maneuver with respect to Congress'
25
ability to regulate minors' access to pornography via the Internet.
However, because COPA's definitions satisfied the stringent requirements of the First Amendment, the only remaining Constitutional conundrum for Congress to overcome is implementing a system that is the
"least restrictive means" available, capable of achieving Congress' stated
goal in enacting COPA. Part III of this Comment suggests two alternatives to COPA's age verification requirement that would be both capable
of surviving strict scrutiny under the First Amendment as well as an
effective means of protecting minors from the harmful effects of exposure
to pornography.
The two suggested alternatives are inspired by recent rules enacted
prohibiting telemarketers from soliciting consumers telephonically, provided an individual consumer has affirmatively decided to be permanently removed from the telemarketers' list. This Comment suggests a
similar system for "opting-out" of being able to access Web sites that are
deemed to fall under the purview of the controlling statute. The two alternatives suggested are a National Anti-Porn Internet Protocol Registry
or a National Anti-Porn Cookie. Either of these suggestions is capable of
withstanding strict scrutiny under the First Amendment. They both put
the onus on individual Internet users to determine for themselves
whether they want to be able to access sexually explicit content available
via the Internet.

24. See Ginsbergv. NY, 390 U.S. 629, 634-635 (1968) (holding that a conviction under
a New York law prohibiting the sale of material to a minor under the age of 17 was a valid
restriction of free speech because, although the material being sold was not obscene to
adults, the law did not bar either the stocking of the "girlie picture magazines," or the
selling of said magazines to persons over 17 years old).
25. See Ashcroft 11, 124 S.Ct. at 2795 (stating that in striking down COPA, the Court
did not indicate that Congress was wholly incapable of drafting legislation designed to prevent minors form exposure to pornography via the Internet).
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BACKGROUND

As previously discussed, Congress has recently enacted several laws
that seek to resolve the problems resulting from exposure to minors of
pornography via the Internet. The first to be discussed in detail is CIPA,
secondly this Comment will address the CDA, and finally COPA will be
analyzed.
A.

THE CHILD INTERNET PROTECTION ACT

CIPA was enacted to combat the problems 26 inherent with the availability of Internet pornography accessible via public library Internet accessible computer terminals. 27 The effect of CIPA caused public libraries
receiving federal funds to lose such funding in the event that the library
failed to install filtering software on Internet accessible computer termi28
nals capable of blocking out harmful, sexually explicit content.
At present, public libraries receiving federal funding obtain such
funding by virtue of either of two federal programs, and in some cases,
both. 29 The first program is the E-rate program which was established
as part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.30 The E-rate program
provides qualifying libraries with the ability to obtain Internet access at
a discount rate. 3 1 The second program relevant to CIPA is governed by
the Library Services and Technology Act (hereinafter "LSTA"). 3 2 Under
the LSTA, the Institute of Museum and Library Services "makes grants
to state library administration agencies to 'electronically lin[k] libraries
with educational, social, or information services,' 'assis [t] libraries in accessing information through electronic networks,' and 'pa[y] costs for libraries to acquire or share computer systems and telecommunications
technologies.'"33
Among those bringing suit alleging that CIPA was unconstitutional
34
were a group of libraries, library patrons, and Web site publishers.
26. See Am. Lib. Assn., Inc., 539 U.S. at 200 (stating Congress recognized that the
availability of Internet pornography via public libraries' Internet accessible computers exposed minors to such content through their own searches, by virtue of adults accessing such
content in close proximity to minors, or by adults printing sexually explicit materials at
library printers).
27. Id. at 198-199.
28. Id. at 199.
29. Id.
30. 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(1)(B) (2005).
31. Am. Lib. Assn., Inc., 539 U.S. at 199.
32. 20 U.S.C. § 9101 et seq. (2005).
33. See Am. Lib. Assn., Inc., 539 U.S. at 199 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 9101(a)(1)(B), (C), and

(E)).
34. Id. at 201 (stating Web site publishers included the American Library Association
and the Multnomah County Library in Portland, Oregon).
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The suit was brought against the United States as well as the Governmental agencies and officials who administer both the E-rate program
and the LSTA. 35 The case went to trial and the Court held that CIPA
36
was unconstitutional.
The Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania enjoined the
agencies charged with administering the E-rate and LSTA programs
from withholding federal funding from libraries that failed to comply
with the provisions of CIPA. 37 Specifically the District Court ruled that,
"any public library that complies with CIPA's conditions will necessarily
violate the First Amendment." 38 The District Court subjected CIPA to
strict scrutiny although the First Amendment generally only requires libraries' content-based decisions about which print materials to add to
39
their collections meet the less stringent rational basis test.
The District Court distinguished this situation from the average decision of a library to carry, or not to carry, certain print material from the
library providing access to the Internet. 40 The District Court reasoned
41
that Internet access within a public library is akin to a public forum.
As such, analyzing Internet access via a library computer terminal as a
form of public forum, CIPA fell under the purview of strict scrutiny as
opposed to the usual rational basis standard, according to the District
Court. 4 2 Under strict scrutiny the District Court held that, although the
Government had a compelling interest in preventing minors from gaining access to pornography via the Internet, CIPA's requirement that libraries install filtering software on their Internet accessible computer
terminals was not narrowly tailored enough to further such interests of
Congress. 4 3 The United States appealed the decision of the District
44
Court and the Supreme Court reversed the District Court's holding.
In reversing the District Court, the Supreme Court rejected the view
that Internet access via public library computer terminals constituted a
public forum, 45 therefore, the District Court misplaced the strict scru35. Id. at 202.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Am. Lib. Assn., Inc., 201 F.Supp.2d at 453.
39. Id. at 462.
40. Am. Lib. Assn., Inc., 539 U.S. at 202.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Am. Lib. Assn., Inc., 201 F.Supp.2d at 479.
44. Am. Lib. Assn., 539 U.S. at 214.
45. See id. at 206-207 (quoting S.Rep. No. 106-141, p. 7 (1999) "A public library does
not acquire Internet terminals in order to create a public forum for Web publishers to express themselves ... [Internet terminals are] simply another method for making information available in a school or library.' [They are] 'no more than a technological extension of
the book stack'").
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46

tiny standard.
The District Court also added as another basis for striking down
CIPA, the propensity of filtering software to block Internet content that
is not pornographic. 47 The majority on appeal, however, rejected this argument. 48 Although filtering software's limitations may result in erroneous blockage of some material that is not pornographic, the majority
opinion noted that library Internet users who encountered such erroneously blocked Web sites needed only ask that a librarian unblock such a
site. 49 Further, CIPA provides authorization for librarians to "'disable' a
filter altogether 'to enable access for bona fide research or other lawful
purposes."5 0 Again, the District Court found CIPA lacking in this respect
as well, because there may be adults too embarrassed to request that a
librarian unblock certain content. 5 1 However, the majority, in reversing,
rejected such an argument as a basis for holding CIPA
unconstitutional. 52
The majority further rejected the claim that CIPA imposed an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of federal assistance. 53 Under the
unconstitutional condition doctrine "'the government may not deny a
benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected ... freedom of speech even if he has no entitlement to that benefit. 1' 5 4 The majority rejected this argument stating that the Government
is entitled to define the limits of any program it establishes by the appropriation of funds. 55 In the case at bar the Government was not denying
benefits at all, it was simply making sure that the public funds it appro56
priated were spent for purposes authorized under the Act.
In sum, according to a majority of the Supreme Court, CIPA was a
valid exercise of Congress' spending power 57 because the CIPA did not
penalize public libraries by refusing to allocate funds in cases where li46. Id. at 208. (explaining that since libraries would be merely exercising their ordinary discretion in complying with CIPA, strict scrutiny is inapplicable and the rational
basis standard should be applied).
47. Am. Lib. Assn., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d at 449.
48. Am. Lib. Assn., Inc., 539 U.S. at 209.
49. Id.
50. Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C § 9134(f)(3)).
51. U.S. v. Am. Lib. Assn., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d at 411.
52. Am. Lib. Assn., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d at 209 (stating "the Constitution does not
guarantee the right to acquire information at a public library without any risk of
embarrassment").
53. Id. at 210-211.
54. Id. at 210 (quoting Bd.ofCommrs. Waubaunsee Cty v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674
(1996)).
55. Id. at 211 (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991)).
56. Id. at 211-212. (stating "[clongress may certainly insist that these public funds be
spent for the purposes for which they were authorized").
57. Id. at 214.
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braries do not comply with the Act. 58 "To the extent that libraries wish
to offer unfiltered access they are free to do so without federal
59
assistance."
B.

THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT

The CDA was enacted as part of the Telecommunications Act of
199660 ("TA"). The TA has seven Titles. 6 1 The TA's primary purpose
was to encourage rapid deployment of new telecommunication technolo63
62
Title V of the TA contains the CDA.
gies through reduced regulation.
The CDA was Congress' first attempt at regulating minors' access to pornography via the Internet. 6 4 The CDA's purpose was to prohibit the
knowing transmission over the Internet of indecent or obscene content to
65
any recipient under 18 years old.
Two specific provisions of the CDA were responsible for inviting the
Constitutional challenge resulting in its demise. First was the "indecent
transmission" provision, which provided, in relevant part:
(a)Whoever (1) in interstate or foreign communications (B) by means of telecommunications device knowingly (i) makes, creates, or solicits, and
(ii) initiates the transmission of,
any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene or indecent, knowing that the recipient of the
communication is under 18 years of age, regardless of whether the
maker of such communication placed the call or initiated the
communication;
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under his control
to be used for any activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent
that it be used for such activity,
shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned no more that two years, or
both.66 .

The second was the "patently offensive display" provision, which provided, in relevant part:
58. See Am. Lib. Assn., Inc, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 212. Refusal to fund a protected activity
on its own is not analogous to imposing a penalty. Id.
59. Id.
60. Reno , 521 U.S. at 858.
61. Id. at 858.
62. Id. at 857 (quoting Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 1 (1996)).
63. Id.
64. Bryan T. McAffee, Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union: The Latest Attempt
to Protect Children from Internet Pornography,5 J. L. & Faro. Stud. 159, 159 (2003).
65. Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 567.
66. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a).
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(d) Whoever (1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly (A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific person or
persons under 18 years of age, or
(B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a manner available to a person under 18 years of age, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive
as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs, regardless of whether the user of such service
placed the call or initiated the communication; or
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under such person's control to be used for an activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with
the intent that it be used for such activity,
fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or
shall 6be
7
both.
Congress qualified the above provisions by including in the CDA two
affirmative defenses. 68 The first protected those who took "good faith,
reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions" to restrict access by minors to the content prohibited by the statute, and the second protected
those who required consumers to use one of several statutorily accepted
69
age verification methods.
The CDA came before the Supreme Court in the case of Reno v.
70
American Civil Liberties Union as soon as the Act was signed into law.
After an evidentiary hearing, a three-judge panel for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement
of the CDA. 7 Each Judge wrote separately, but all reached the same
72
ultimate conclusion - that the CDA was unconstitutional.
67. 47 U.S.C. § 223(d).
68. Reno, 521 U.S. at 860.
69. 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(5)(A) and (B). (providing in full: (5) It is a defense to prosecution under subsection (a)(1)(B) or (d) of this section, or under subsection (a)(2) of this section with respect to the use of a facility for an activity under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this
section that a person has (A) has taken, in good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions under
the circumstances to restrict or prevent access by minors to a communication
specified in such subsections, which may involve any appropriate measures to
restrict minors from such communications, including any method which is feasible under available technology; or
(B) has restricted access to such communication by requiring use of a verified
credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult personal identification
number).
70. See Reno , 521 U.S. at 861-862 (reflecting that 20 plaintiffs filed intitially, and that
after a T.R.O. issued against enforcement of the CDA, 27 additional plaintiffs filed a second
suit at which point the cases were consolidated).
71. Id. at 862.
72. Id. at 864. (explaining the decision by the District Court enjoined enforcement of
the CDA as it pertained to the prohibitions therein that related to indecent communica-
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On appeal the Government argued, to no avail as the Supreme Court
in a near unanimous 73 decision upheld the ruling of the District Court,
that the District Court erred in concluding that the CDA was violative of
both the First Amendment because it was overbroad and the Fifth
74
Amendment because it was too vague.
The Government first argued that the CDA was constitutionally
based on three prior decisions by the Court.7 5 The Court, however, systematically distinguished each of those cases from the one that was pres76
ently before it.
First, the Government argued that under Ginsberg v. N.Y., the CDA
was Constitutional. However, the Court distinguished the statute upheld in Ginsberg because it was decidedly narrower than the CDA, while
it prevented certain sales to minors it by no means prevented an adult
from purchasing material for their children. 77 Conversely under the
CDA a parent's consent or even their participation in a prohibited communication could not prevent enforcement of criminality under the statute. 78 . The Court further noted, the New York statute at issue in
Ginsberg was applicable only to commercial transactions whereas the
CDA contained no such limitation. 79 Also, the New York statute combined in its definition of 'harmful to minors' an additional requirement
that the material also be "'utterly without redeeming social importance
for minors."'8 0 The CDA in comparison contained no such definitional
requirement.8 1 Finally, under the New York statute a minor was defined as under the age of 17, conversely the CDA applied to all individutions, but did not enjoin the Government from enforcing certain other provisions, notably
the provision entitling the Government to investigate and prosecute obscenity and child
pornography).
73. Id. at 848. Stevens, J. delivered the Court's opinion and Scalia, Kennedy, Souter,
Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. O'Connor, J. filed an opinion which concurred in the
judgment in part and dissented in part, and Rehnquist, C.J. joined O'Connor.
74. Id. at 864 (noting the Court reached its judgment without having to make a decision with regards to the alleged Fifth Amendment violation of the Act).
75. Id.; Ginsberg, 390 U.S. 629 (holding that a New York statute that made it illegal
to sell to minors under the age of 17 material that was obscene to them but not to adults
was Constitutional); See generally, F.C.C. v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (holding that
although a radio broadcast entitled "Filthy Words" was not obscene, because of its indecent
nature the F.C.C. could regulate such a broadcast as it was easily available to children);
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (holding a zoning ordinance that kept
adult movie theatres out of residential neighborhoods Constitutional).
76. Reno, 521 U.S. at 865-868
77. Id. at 865.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. (quoting Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 646).
81. Id.
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82
als under 18 years of age.
Secondly, the Government argued the CDA's Constitutional validity
was established by the Court's decision in F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation.
The Court again found the Government's reliance on the decision in
Pacifica8 3 was equally distinguishable to the case presently before it. In
Pacifica, the F.C.C. order at issue "targeted a specific broadcast that
represented a rather dramatic departure from traditional program content in order to designate when, rather than whether, it would be permissible to air such a program in that particular media."8 4 In contrast,
the Court held, because the CDA's prohibitions were not limited to times,
and were not dependent on any evaluation by a government agency familiar with the Internet's unique characteristics, that it was unconstitutional.8 5 Furthermore, the CDA's prohibitions were punitive whereas
the order issued in Pacificawas not.8 6 To round things out, the medium
at issue in Pacifica was one in which historically had been given very
limited First Amendment protection whereas the Internet has no such
87
historical predisposition towards regulation.
Finally, the Court distinguished the Government's reliance on Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.8 8 The Court held that the CDA was a content-based regulation whereas the zoning ordinance at issue in Renton
was not.8 9 The zoning ordinance "was aimed not at the content of the
films being shown in the theatres, but rather at the 'secondary effects,'
such as crime and deteriorating property values, that these theatres fostered: "It is th[e] secondary effect which these zoning ordinances attempt
to avoid, not the dissemination of 'offensive' speech."" 9 0 Although the
Government argued that the CDA was simply a form of "cyber zoning" 9 1
the Court held, because the CDA's own stated purpose was to "protect
children from the primary effects of indecent and patently offensive
speech, rather than the secondary effects of such speech,"9 2 such argument to the contrary by the Government must necessarily fail9 3 [emphasis added].

82. Reno, 521 U.S. at 865-866.
83. Pacifica,438 U.S. at 726.
84. Reno, 521 U.S. at 867.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Renton, 475 U.S. at 41.
89. Reno, 521 U.S. at 867-868.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 868.
92. Id.
93. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (holding that regulations which focus
on a direct impact of speech are improperly analyzed under the guidelines set forth in
Renton).

464

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XXIII

After the Court dispatched with distinguishing the above three cases
from the controversy at hand with respect to the challenged provisions of
the CDA, it turned to the text of the CDA itself in order to further justify
94
its decision.
The Court first found problematic the fact that each of the challenged provisions of the CDA at issue used a different "linguistic form."9 5
Furthermore, neither of the two "linguistic form[s]" were defined which
the Court felt would provoke uncertainty among speakers as to how the
"forms" both relate to each other and what each means with respect to
the other. 9 6 This vagueness was problematic for two reasons: 1. Since
the CDA was a content-based regulation of speech, such vagueness necessarily carried with it a chilling effect on free speech; and 2. The CDA,
being a criminal statute, the severity of which may have the effect of
causing a speaker to remain silent although his communication may ar97
guably be lawful, was also problematic.
On appeal the Government argued that the CDA was not vague
based on the standard established with respect to obscenity in Miller v.
California.9 s At issue in Miller was a criminal conviction resulting from
a commercial vendor mailing brochures that contained sexually explicit
material. 9 9 The test established in Miller is, to this day, the current controlling standard defining obscenity. 10 0 The Miller test is as follows:
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community
standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest;
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
1°1
political, or scientific value.
The Court rejected that the CDA complied with the requirements of
Miller10 2 because the second prong of the Miller test requires that the
applicable state law specifically define the proscribed material and the
CDA failed to satisfy the test.'0 3 The CDA was further lacking in that
the Miller test limits its definition to sexual conduct, but the CDA ex94. Reno, 521 U.S. at 864.
95. Id. at 871; 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (using the term "indecent" while § 223(d) addresses
material that "in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards, sexual, excretory activities or organs").
96. Reno, 521 U.S. at 871
97. Id. at 872 (citing Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 494 (1965)).
98. Miller v. California,413 U.S. 15 (1973).
99. Id. at 18.
100. Reno, 521 U.S. at 872.
101. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
102. Reno, 521 U.S. at 873.
103. Id.
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tended beyond sexual content including both excretory activities and orl0 4
gans of both sexual and excretory nature.
The second prong of the Miller test was particularly important to the
Court because it is not subject to a contemporary community standard. 10 5 Therefore, individual courts would have to subject a non-existent national standard thus "present[ing] a greater threat of censoring
speech that, in fact, fell outside [the CDA's] scope. '0 6 Due to this failure,
the CDA lacked the requisite precision required by the First Amendment
when a statute is a content-based regulation of speech, 10 7 and was,
therefore, unconstitutional.
C.

THE CHILD ONLINE PROTECTION ACT

In response to the decision in Reno, Congress again attempted to
draft legislation that would serve the purpose' 0 8 of protecting minors
from exposure to sexually explicit content via the Internet. 10 9 Specifically, in response to the Court's concerns with the CDA's over-breadth,
Congress limited COPA in three ways. 1 10 First, unlike the CDA, which
applied to the Internet as a whole, COPA only applied to content displayed on the World Wide Web."' Second, COPA only applied to communications made for "commercial purposes." 1 12 Finally, unlike the
CDA, which sought to prohibit indecent and patently offensive communications, COPA only restricted that material which is "harmful to
" 113
minors.
Like the CDA, COPA also provided affirmative defenses to protect
providers of sexually explicit content on the Internet. 114 One could qualify for protection under the affirmative defenses provided for if he, "in
good faith has restricted access by minors to material that is harmful to
minors:
(A) by requiring the use of a credit card, debit account, adult access
code, or adult personal identification number;
(B) by accepting a digital certificate that verifies age; or
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 873-874.
107. Id.
108. Pub. L. 105-277, Tit. XIV, § 1402(1), 112 Stat. 2681-736 (1998). (stating Congress'
stated goal in enacting COPA was to help parents supervise and control that content which
their children, because of the Internet's ever growing widespread use, may inadvertently
access thus suffering the harm that sexually explicit material can have on minors).
109. Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 569-570.
110. Id. at 569.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 570 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(2)(A)).
113. Id.

114. Id.
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(C) by any other
reasonable measures that are feasible under available
1 15
technology.
Approximately one month before COPA went into effect a group of
organizations brought suit challenging the Constitutionality of COPA.116
1.

Ashcroft I

COPA first came before the Supreme Court on a very limited issue. 117 That issue was "[wihether [COPA's] use of 'community standards' to identify 'material that is harmful to minors"'1 8 violated the
First Amendment." 119 Initially the Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania concluded that COPA's challengers established a likelihood of success on the merits, 1 20 and thereby issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting COPA from going into effect. 12 1 The District Court
first determined that COPA fell under the purview of strict scrutiny
under the First Amendment because it was a content-based regulation
on speech. 12 2 Under the strict scrutiny standard the District Court concluded that COPA could not be constitutionally valid because COPA was
115. 47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(1).
116. Ashcroft 1, 535 U.S. at 571.
117. Id. at 566.
118. 47 U.S.C. § 231 states in relevant part:
(a) Requirement to restrict access (1) Prohibited Conduct Whoever knowingly and with knowledge of the character of the material, in interstate or foreign commerce by means of the World Wide Web, makes any communication for commercial purposes that is available to any minor and that includes
any material that is harmful to minors shall be fined not more than $50,000.00,
imprisoned not more than 6 months, or both.
(e) Definitions
(6) Material that is harmful to minors
The term "material that is harmful to minors" means any communication, picture,
image, graphic image file, article, recording, writing, or other matter of any kind
that is obscene or that (A) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find,
taking the material as a whole and with respect to minors, is designed to appeal
to, or is designed to pander to, the prurient interest;
(B) depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive with respect to
minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an actual or simulated
normal or perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent female breast; and
(C) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for
minors.
(7) Minor
The term "minor" means any person under 17 years of age.
119. Ashcroft 1, 535 U.S. at 566.
120. Am. Civil Lib. Union v. Reno, 31 F.Supp.2d 473, 498 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
121. Id. at 499.
122. Id. at 493.
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not the least restrictive means available to Congress to achieve the goal
of preventing minors from exposure to sexually explicit content via the
123
Internet.
The District Court's ruling was affirmed on appeal by the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 1 24 The Circuit Court, however, affirmed
on a completely separate basis than did the District Court. 125 The Circuit Court found COPA to be substantially overbroad because of its use
of "contemporary community standards" to identify content that is harmful to minors.1 26 The Circuit Court reasoned that since Web publishers
are unable to limit access to their Web sites based on geographic location
the most puritanical community would essentially set the standard for
what is deemed "harmful to minors" under COPA. 12 7 Due to the Circuit
Court's sua sponte ruling that virtually ignored the reasoning of the District Court, the Supreme Court on appeal was only able to analyze COPA
128
on a limited basis.
In comparing COPA to the CDA the Supreme Court recognized that
COPA did not suffer from the same inherent flaws. 12 9 Further, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Circuit Court's fear that Web publishers
would be burdened because of an inability to limit access based on geographic areas. 1 30 Since COPA incorporated the Miller test to determine
whether or not something was obscene, to hold it unconstitutional on
that basis would render other federal obscenity statutes unconstitutional
as well. 13 1 The majority held that COPA was not facially unconstitutional. 13 2 The Court remanded the case back to the Third Circuit for
133
further proceedings.
123. Id. at 497.
124. Am. Civil Lib. Union v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 173-174 (3d Cir. 2000).
125. Ashcroft 1, 535 U.S. at 572.
126. Id. at 572-573.
127. Am. Civil Lib. Union v. Reno, 217 F.3d at 175.
128. Ashcroft 1, 535 U.S. at 575.
129. See id. at 578 (stating that COPA applies to significantly less material than did the
CDA, and its definition of what constitutes material that is "harmful to minors" includes
within it the Miller obscenity test).
130. See id. at 579 (citing Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974) (noting States
may choose to define obscenity offenses with respect to contemporary community standards
as defined in Miller with nothing more, or may choose to use more precise geographic
criteria).
131. Id. at 584.
132. See id. (stating that to prevail on a facial constitutional challenge more is required
to be shown than that the statute may have a small degree of over-breadth).
133. See id. (reemphasizing that the decision that COPA's use of community standards
in its definition of material that is harmful to minors did not by itself render the statute
unconstitutional. The Court reserved judgment as to whether COPA may fail to be Constitutional for a slew of other reasons including, but not limited to, whether COPA is too
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2. Ashcroft II
On remand, the Circuit Court again found COPA to be constitutionally lacking, reaffirming the District Court's grant of preliminary injunction.' 34 In a second appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of
preliminary injunction by the District Court on the same grounds relied
upon by the District Court, 13 5 and did not consider the justifications re36
lied upon by the Circuit Court.1
The Court held that the Government failed to meet its burden of
proving that COPA's content-based regulation on speech was both a
more effective and less restrictive means of achieving Congress' goal of
protecting minors from exposure to sexually explicit material over the
Internet than the alternatives proposed by those challenging the statute's Constitutionality. 13 7 Since there were several less restrictive alternatives to COPA the Court could not reverse the District Court's grant of
a preliminary injunction, and instead remanded the case for a trial on
138
the merits.
III.

IN THE IMMORTAL WORDS OF AXL ROSE: "WHERE DO WE
GO NOW, SWEET CHILD O'MINE?"

With the background accounted for, at least two things become clear:
1. Congress was successful in limiting the reach of COPA and defining
its terms to achieve constitutionality, at least somewhat, under the First
Amendment; 13 9 and 2. The Court is divided as to what the "least restrictive means" of enforcing a statute that seeks to regulate minors' access to
pornography via the Internet would be. 140 However, where does this
14 1
will
leave Congress, assuming that the District Court, on remand,
vague, whether COPA would be overbroad for other reasons, or whether COPA would not
survive strict scrutiny on the merits).
134. Ashcroft 11, 124 S. Ct. at 2790.
135. Id. at 2791.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 2791-2792.
138. See id. at 2795 (stating that the holding in no way prevents the Government from
proving at trial that COPA is in fact the least restrictive means of achieving Congress'
stated goal). Since several years had passed from the time of the initial suit to the present
technological advances may well have changed such that COPA is Constitutional, however,
the record at this time did not reflect whether those changes had occurred.
139. See Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 585 (stating that since COPA's range of restriction was
narrowed consistent with the obscenity defintion established in Miller the use of community standards to achieve COPA's purpose was not "substantial enough to violate the First
Amendment").
140. As evidenced by the change in attitude towards filtering software by the justices
dissenting in U.S. v. American Library Assn., Inc. who now favor filtering software above
age verification requirements. U.S. v. American Library Assn., Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
141. Ashcroft 11, 124 S. Ct. at 2795.
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ultimately conclude that the Government failed to prove that age verification, as required by COPA, was the least restrictive means of achiev14 2
ing Congress' stated goal?
The Court explained in Ashcroft If that Congress has the ability to
enact legislation to encourage parents to use Internet filtering
software. 1 4 3 However, that should not be the extent of Congress' reach
in this area of regulation.'4 Congress has both a compelling and legitimate interest in protecting minors from the effects of exposure to pornography via the Internet. As such, it owes its constituents more than just
encouragement; Congress owes a viable means of protecting children.
While COPA came up slightly short of the Supreme Court's expectations,
Congress almost achieved its goal. They were on the right track, but
stopped just short of the station.
A.

NEXT STOP - THE

ANTI-PoRN

REGISTRY/COOMIE -

Two

LESS

RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVES TO AGE VERIFICATION SOFTWARE CAPABLE
OF WITHSTANDING CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY

1.

An Introductory Analogy

Interestingly, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC")
and the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") have recently established
rules attempting to regulate a different household intruder, Telemarketers. 145 The rules are known as the National Do Not Call Registry
("NDNCR"). 1 4 6 The NDNCR is an "opt-in" program allowing consumers
to choose to restrict telemarketers' access to them. 14 7 "The [NDNCR]
offers consumers a tool with which they can protect their homes against
intrusions that Congress has determined to be particularly invasive." 148
142. Id.
143. Id. at 2793.
144. Compare Tanessa Cabe, Regulation of Speech on the Internet: Fourth Time's the
Charm?, 11 Fall Med. L. & Policy 50, 60-61 (2002) (positing that the U.S. should follow
Europe's lead - merely encouraging through legislative incentives the use and development
of filtering software); see also Council of Europe, EuropeanForum on Harmful and Illegal
Cyber Content, http://www.coe.int/t/e/ cyberforum/ (accessed Oct. 23, 2004).
145. Mainstream Marketing Services, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 358 F.3d 1228,
1235 (10th Cir. 2004).
146. Id. (stating the NDNRC's historical roots date back to 1991 wherein Congress enacted legislation aimed at protecting consumers from telemarketing abuses).
147. Id. at 1232. The NDNCR provides a mechanism by which consumers give notice to
telemarketers that they have no interest in receiving telephone calls for the purpose of
solicitation. This mechanism prevents only commercial telemarketers, and does not apply
to charitable or political organizations.
148. Id. at 1233. (illustrating that because a consumer can avoid "door-to-door" solicitation by placing a "No Solicitation" sign on his or her front stoop it is logical to allow consumers a similar method of avoiding telemarketers. The NDNCR is simply a "No Solicitation"
sign directed at telemarketers.)
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14 9
In 2003 the FTC and FCC enacted the rules that became the NDNCR.
So far, the NDNCR has withstood Constitutional scrutiny under the
First Amendment.15 0 It stands to reason that the government's worthwhile interest in protecting the personal privacy of individuals in their
homes from telemarketers pales in comparison to the interest in protecting minors from the harmful effects of exposure to pornography via the
Internet. This begs the question, could the Federal Government establish some kind of Anti-Porn Registry capable of withstanding Constitutional scrutiny? The answer is in the affirmative.
Unfortunately the analogy of the National Anti-Porn Internet Protocol Registry and the National Anti-Porn Cookie to the National Do Not
Call List, briefly discussed above, is only skin deep. Although the National Do Not Call Registry only applies to commercial speech, 151 it is
further limited to purely commercial advertising. 15 2 Pure commercial
advertising regulations are not reviewed under strict scrutiny. 153 The
proposed National Anti-Porn Internet Protocol Registry and National

149. Id. at 1234; see also, 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B) (codifying the FTC rule establishing the NDNCR stateing, in relevant part:
(b) Pattern of calls.
(1) It is an abusive telemarketing act or practice and a violation of this Rule for a
telemarketer to engage in, or for a seller to cause a telemarketer to engage in, the
following conduct:
(iii) Initiating any outbound telephone call to a person when:
(B) that person's telephone number is on the "do-not-call" registry, maintained by
the Commission, of persons who do not wish to receive outbound telephone calls to
induce the purchase of goods or services ...
The FCC rule establishing the NDNCR is codified at 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2), it
states, in relevant part:
(c) No person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation, as defined in paragraph (f)(9) of this section, to:
(2) A residential subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on
the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone
solicitations that maintained by the federal government. Such do-not-call registrations must be honored for a period of 5 years...).
150. Id. at 1233 (stating four aspects of the NDNCR convinced the 10th Circuit Court of
Appeals that it was consistent with the First Amendment's requirements: 1. The list was
restrictive only of "core commercial speech;" 2. The NDNCR targeted only that speech invasive of the privacy of the home, "a personal sanctuary that enjoys a unique status under
our constitutional jurisprudence;" 3. The NDNCR was an "opt-in" program placing the ultimate choice of restriction in the consumer's hands; and 4. The NDNCR materially furthered the government's stated interest).
151. See MainstreamMarketing Services, Inc., 358 F.3d at 1236 (stating that the do-notcall rules established by the FCC and FTC draw a distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech).
152. Id.
153. Id. (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Commn. of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557 (1980)).
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Anti-Porn Cookie would, however, be subject to strict scrutiny because
that content which would be regulated is not purely commercial.154 This
hurdle, although higher, is for the most part, already jumped by the decision in Ashcroft I wherein the majority found the language to satisfy
155
strict scrutiny under the First Amendment.
2.

The National Anti-Porn Internet Protocol Registry

Every computer linked to the Internet is identifiable by a unique
sequence of numbers called an Internet Protocol ("I.P.") address. 15 6 In
157
total, there are 4,294,967,296 possible unique I.P. address values.
158
ComEach unique I.P. is, not entirely, akin to a telephone number.
puters are capable of linking up, or dialing in to one another for many
purposes. 15 9 That each computer has a unique identifying number more
than suggests that a registry equivalent to the NDNCR could be created
wherein Internet content providers falling under the purview of the
"harmful to minors" criteria from COPA, are required to restrict access
to their sites of registered I.P. addresses. 160 Indeed current technology
is already capable of blocking out unwanted I.P. addresses if the Web
16 1
site operator has so chosen.
154. See Sable Commun. of Cal., Inc., v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (stating that the
evaluation of free speech rights of adults with respect to sexually explicit material that is
not obscene is protected under the First Amendment).
155. Ashcroft 1, 535 U.S. at 584.
156. How Stuff Works, What is an IP.Address?, http://computer.howstuffworks.coml
question549.htm) (accessed Nov. 5, 2004) (illustrating that a typical I.P. address looks like
this: 123.45.67.890).
157. Id. (stating of these more than 4 billion combinations there are several I.P. addresses that are reserved for specific purposes. For example, 0.0.0.0 is simply a default I.P.
address and 255.255.255.255 is reserved for broadcasts).
158. A typical telephone number looks like this: 312-345-6789. Dialing the correct sequence of numbers on a telephone results in the ability to contact a specific person in a
specific place. This is not unlike the I.P. address in which a specific number is attached to
a specific computer.
159. For example computers linked together via the Internet are capable of interaction
in the form of video game competition as well as file transfers between machines.
160. The author is merely suggesting a potential solution that would be less restrictive
than age verification software, yet at the same time target the sites considered harmful by
Congress without the use of filtering software that has a tendency to overblock content that
would not ordinarily be cause for alarm. The actual technical aspects of establishing a
system is best left to the computer software programmers, but surely some system could be
put into place.
161. Microsoft, HTTP Error 403.6, http'J/support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=
kb;en-us;306833 (accessed Nov. 1, 2004) (stating when a 403.6 error message appears a
specific I.P. address has been blocked from content on a web page. The specific cause is
that the Web site being accessed has been configured to accept connections from certain
I.P. addresses only).
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Essentially, the gist of the system would rely on an individual user
accessing a federal Web site wherein they are familiarized with how to
find out what their I.P. address is and then enter their I.P. address into
the registry. Then Internet content providers falling under the purview
of COPA's definitional language would be required to update their
"blocked I.P. list" on a daily basis much like a home computer updates its
anti-virus software. 162 Using COPA's definitional language, already
found to be constitutional under the First Amendment, as a starting
point to identify what Internet content providers would be subject to the
registry then coupled with the NDNCR language utilized by the FCC
and FTC would create a statute that may read as follows:
__

U.S.C. §_

Restriction of access to minors to materials commer-

cially distributed by means of the World Wide Web that are harmful to
minors
(a) Requirement to restrict access
(1) Prohibited conduct
Whoever knowingly and with knowledge of the character of the material, in interstate or foreign commerce by means of the World Wide
Web, makes any communication for commercial purposes that is available to any minor and that includes any material that is harmful to minors shall be fined not more than $50,000, imprisoned not more than 6
months, or both, if said communication is communicated by means of
any computer whose unique Internet Protocol or any successive Protocol
address is registered in the National Anti-Porn Registry.
(b) Definitions

(1) By means of the World Wide Web
The term "by means of the World Wide Web" means by placement of
material in a computer server-based file archive so that it is publicly
accessible over the Internet, using hypertext transfer protocol or any
successor protocol.
(2) Commercial purposes; engaged in the business
(A) Commercial purposes
A person shall be considered to make a communication for commercial
purposes only if such person is engaged in the business of making such
communications.
(B) Engaged in the business
The term "engaged in the business" means that the person who makes a
communication, or offers to make a communication, by means of the
World Wide Web, that includes any material that is harmful to minors,
devotes time, attention, or labor to such activities, as a regular course of
such person's trade or business, with the objective of earning a profit as
a result of such activities (although it is not necessary that the person
162. Most computers today are equipped with some form of anti-virus software that automatically logs on to a central server when the computer is first connected to the Internet
whereby it downloads any new virus signatures that have become a threat to computer
stability.
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make a profit or that the making or the offering to make the communications be the person's sole or principal business or source of income). A
person may be considered to be engaged in the business of making, by
means of the World Wide Web, communications for commercial purposes that include material that is harmful to minors, only if the person
knowingly causes the material that is harmful to minors to be accessible
via the World Wide Web on computers whose unique Internet Protocol or
any successive Protocol address has been listed in the National AntiPorn Registry.
(3) Internet
The term "Internet" means the combination of computer facilities and
electromagnetic transmission media, and related equipment and
software, comprising the interconnected worldwide network of computer networks that employ the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet
Protocol or any successor protocol to transmit information.
(4) Material that is harmful to minors
The term "material that is harmful to minors" means any communication, picture, image, graphic image file, article, recording, writing, or
other matter of any kind that is obscene or that (A) the average person, applying contemporary community standards,
would find, taking the material as a whole and with respect to minors,
is designed to appeal to, or is designed to appeal to, or is designed to
pander to, the prurient interest;
(B) depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive
with respect to minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an actual or simulated normal or perverted sexual act, or a lewd
exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent female breast; and
(C) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.
(5) Minor
The term "minor" means any person under 17 years of age.163
3.

The National Anti-Porn Cookie

An alternative to the National Anti-Porn Registry, and also a less
restrictive means than the age-verification requirement of COPA, is a
National Anti-Porn Cookie. Cookies are commonplace on the World
Wide Web. An Internet cookie is "one or more pieces of information
stored as text strings" on a computer. 164 The process of installing cookies to a particular machine is simple and often occurs without an Internet user even knowing. 16 5 A simple example of an Internet cookie
163. The language of this mock statute has been taken almost totally from the language
of COPA, 47 U.S.C. § 231. Anything that is NOT in italics is copied directly from COPA.
164. How Stuff Works, What is an Internet Cookie?, http://www.howstuffworks.coml
question82.htm (accessed Nov. 5, 2004).
165. Id. (stating an accessed web server transmits a cookie to a particular computer
visiting a particular site, and the computer's web browser (Internet Explorer by Microsoft
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and its corresponding functions would be a cookie for The New York
Times' Web site. 16 6 Access to certain news stories and editorials is contingent upon a user entering some personal information for advertising
purposes before being able to view news stories or editorials. The information need only be entered once because the Web site will then install a
cookie on the computer that tells the Web site "this Internet user has
167
already registered and is returning to the site."
The ability of a cookie to tell a Web site being accessed that the particular user has visited the site before is not the only function of Internet
cookies, but it is the most common.16 8 Cookies can be used for any number of purposes because they simply store data. A National Anti-Porn
Cookie could easily be developed that would be able to store the data
necessary to inform those Internet content providers that fall under the
purview of COPA's definitional language that a particular user does not
wish their computer to be able to access the Web site. 1 69 The National
Anti-Porn Cookie could be downloaded to machines from a government
Web site, and any Internet content provider falling under the purview of
the statute's language allowing its content to be accessed by a machine
with said Cookie downloaded and operating properly would be subject to
the statute's penalties. A sample statute may, again using the language
of COPA as a starting point, read as follows:
U.S.C. § __ Restriction of access to minors to materials commercially distributed by means of the World Wide Web that are harmful to
minors
(a) Requirement to restrict access
(1) Prohibited conduct
Whoever knowingly and with knowledge of the character of the material, in interstate or foreign commerce by means of the World Wide
Web, makes any communication for commercial purposes that is available to any minor and that includes any material that is harmful to minors shall be fined not more than $50,000, imprisoned not more than 6
is the most common web browser). The next time the particular site is accessed browser
sends the cookie back to the site's server which recognizes the cookie and changes the visited page accordingly. Essentially what is happening is that the cookie allows a user to
personalize a particular site in that the site "remembers" who or what visited the site).
166. See The New York Times Online, httpJ/www.nytimes.com. (including the New York
Times is the self-described newspaper of record for the United States. Online content at
the Times' Web site mirrors the daily coverage in the newspaper, and also allows users to
access archived articles, and news stories (often times for a small fee)).
167. How Stuff Works, supra n. 164.
168. Id.
169. Again, as stated before the author merely is suggesting viable, less restrictive
means of enforcing Congress' stated goal of protecting minors from the harmful effects of
exposure to pornography via the Internet. The technical aspects of the suggested least
restrictive means would have to be programmed by those with a better understanding of
computer code technology.
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months, or both, if said communication is communicated by means of
any computer which has downloaded and installed the National AntiPorn Cookie.
(b) Definitions
(1) By means of the World Wide Web
The term "by means of the World Wide Web" means by placement of
material in a computer server-based file archive so that it is publicly
accessible over the Internet, using hypertext transfer protocol or any
successor protocol.
(2) Commercial purposes; engaged in the business
(A) Commercial purposes
A person shall be considered to make a communication for commercial
purposes only if such person is engaged in the business of making such
communications.
(B) Engaged in the business
The term "engaged in the business" means that the person who makes a
communication, or offers to make a communication, by means of the
World Wide Web, that includes any material that is harmful to minors,
devotes time, attention, or labor to such activities, as a regular course of
such person's trade or business, with the objective of earning a profit as
a result of such activities (although it is not necessary that the person
make a profit or that the making or the offering to make the communications be the person's sole or principal business or source of income). A
person may be considered to be engaged in the business of making, by
means of the World Wide Web, communications for commercial purposes that include material that is harmful to minors, only if the person
knowingly causes the material that is harmful to minors to be accessible
via the World Wide Web on computers which have downloaded and installed the National Anti-Porn Cookie.
(3) Internet
The term "Internet" means the combination of computer facilities and
electromagnetic transmission media, and related equipment and
software, comprising the interconnected worldwide network of computer networks that employ the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet
Protocol or any successor protocol to transmit information.
(4) Material that is harmful to minors
The term "material that is harmful to minors" means any communication, picture, image, graphic image file, article, recording, writing, or
other matter of any kind that is obscene or that (A) the average person, applying contemporary community standards,
would find, taking the material as a whole and with respect to minors,
is designed to appeal to, or is designed to appeal to, or is designed to
pander to, the prurient interest;
(B) depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive
with respect to minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an actual or simulated normal or perverted sexual act, or a lewd
exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent female breast; and
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(C) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.
(5) Minor
17 0
The term "minor" means any person under 17 years of age.
4. Will They Be Constitutional?
COPA's ultimate Constitutional downfall was not its definition of
what content fell under its purview; 17 1 COPA's age verification requirements placing the onus on the Internet content providers to fix the system simply fell short of being the least restrictive means of enforcing the
statute. 17 2 Either of the above alternatives to age verification software
are less restrictive and more effective than the filtering software now
lauded, hypocritically so, as the holy grail of protection to minors. 173
First and foremost, the definition of what material is harmful to minors utilizing the Miller test has already survived a majority of the Supreme Court, 17 4 and would likely survive a third round of Supreme
Court scrutiny. 175 The most important question is whether either of
170. The language of this mock statute has been taken almost totally from the language
of COPA, 47 U.S.C. § 231. Anything that is NOT in italics is copied directly from COPA.
171. See Ashcroft H, 124 S. Ct. at 2795 (stating that although COPA was likely unconstitutional because age verification software was not the least restrictive means of preventing minors' access to pornography via the Internet, Congress is not without the ability to
enact legislation that could further its worthy goal).
172. Id.
173. See Id. at 2796 (Stevens, J. concurring) (stating "encouraging deployment of userbased controls, such as filtering software, would serve Congress' interest in protecting minors from sexually explicit Internet materials as well or better than attempting to regulate
the vast content of the World Wide Web at its source, and at a far less significant cost to the
First Amendment"); contraAmerican Lib. Assn., Inc, 539 U.S. at 222 (stating that "[gliven
the quantity and ever-changing character of Web sites offering free sexually explicit material, it is inevitable that a substantial amount of such material will never be blocked. Because of this 'underblocking,' the statute will provide parents with a false sense of security
without really solving the problem that motivated its enactment. Conversely, the
software's reliance on words to identify undesirable sites necessarily results in the blocking
of thousands of pages that 'contain content that is completely innocuous for both adults and
minors, and that no rational person could conclude matches the filtering companies' category definitions, such as 'pornography' or 'sex.' In my opinion a statutory blunderbuss that
mandates this vast amount of 'overblocking' abridges the freedom of speech protected by
the First Amendment.").
174. See Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 584-585 (holding that COPA's restrictions based on a
test analogous to the Miller obscenity test is consistent with past precedent and "any variance caused by the statute's reliance on community standards is not substantial enough to
violate the First Amendment").
175. See e.g. Warren Richey, One Justice's Vision ofRole of the Courts, Christian Science

Monitor, U.S.A. p. 1 (Nov. 16, 2004) (stating with the re-election of George W. Bush, a
republican president who has stated that he would nominate judges that are akin to Justices Thomas and Scalia, coupled with the state of the Court at present, even conservative
estimates indicate that at least 2 seats will be up during the next four year term meaning
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these alternatives would in fact be the least restrictive means available
to Congress.
Both the National Anti-Porn Registry as well as the National AntiPorn Cookie would be less restrictive, and more effective than content
filtering software. The standard established in Ashcroft II to determine
whether a content-based restriction on speech is the least restrictive
means is as follows: 1. The Court assumes that "certain protected speech
may be regulated;" 176 2. Then the Court asks, what is the least restrictive way that can be used to achieve Congress' stated goal? 177 "The purpose of the test is to ensure that speech is restricted no further than
necessary to achieve the goal, for it is important to assure that legitimate
speech is not chilled or punished." 178 When there is a challenge to a
content-based speech regulation, the burden is placed on the Government to prove that the alternatives proposed will not be as effective as
179
the regulation.
Assuming either of the mock statutes detailed above was signed into
law, it is safe to say that a challenge to their constitutionality would be
immediately forthcoming.18 0 The likely argument against such a statute, as it has worked in the past, would be that the newly created I.P.
Registry or Cookie is violative of the First Amendment because it is a
content-based restriction on speech and is not the least restrictive means
of implementing such a restriction. 18 1 Such an argument must necessarily fail because, as will be discussed in detail, an opt-out program creating civil and criminal penalties will not cause content providers to
"remain silent rather than communicate," 182 or place on them too heavy
a burden.
that by the time another version of COPA came to the fore the likely makeup of the Court
would again uphold the definitions utilized by COPA). Assuming of course that new justices, akin to Scalia and Thomas who voted to uphold the COPA's definitions, would likewise uphold said definitions).
176. Ashcroft 11, 124 S. Ct. at 2791.
177. Id.
178. Id.
[T]he test does not begin with the status quo of existing regulations, then ask
whether the challenged restriction has some additional ability to achieve Congress' legitimate interest. Any restriction on speech could be justified under that
analysis. Instead the court should ask whether the challenged regulation is the
least restrictive means among available, effective alternatives.

Id.
179. Id.
180. See Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 571 (stating that COPA was challenged almost immediately from its inception).
181. Id. at 571-572 (stating challengers argument: The statute violated adults' rights
under both the First and Fifth Amendments because, first, it created an effective ban on
protected speech, and second, it was not the least restrictive means of achieving the government's stated goal of protecting minors).
182. Reno, 521 U.S. at 872 (citing Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 494 (1965)).
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In analyzing whether either of the above suggested alternatives
would satisfy the "least restrictive means" requirement an initial principle must first be posited - "[wihere the designed benefit of a contentbased speech restriction is to shield the sensibilities of listeners, the general rule is that the right of expression prevails, even where no less restrictive alternative exists."18 3 That being said, and although
individuals are expected to protect their own personal interests with respect to unwanted speech "simply by averting their eyes," 18 4 the present
regulations being suggested further a compelling interest, the interest in
preventing minors' exposure and access to Internet pornography, and
thus justify Congress' compelling interest and need to take affirmative
action. However, "even where speech is indecent and enters the home,
the objective of shielding children does not suffice to support a blanket
ban if the protection can be accomplished by a less restrictive alternative." 18 5 Inevitably an attack on the National Anti-Porn I.P. Registry as
well as the National Anti-Porn Cookie would rest on the argument that
filtering software is less restrictive, therefore either of the two programs
would be unconstitutional. Fortunately this argument is not sound.
The Government, in any case where the regulation imposed by Congress is content-based, must overcome the high hurdle of strict scrutiny.1 8 6 In a case such as this, where the alternative to any regulation
essentially amounts to the Government being hamstrung into having no
ability to affirmatively regulate that which it seeks to, the hurdle is especially high. The current alternative, government encouragement of filtering software, is inherently less restrictive than any other means
simply because it amounts to the Government being effectively taken out
of the equation entirely.' 8 7 "It is always less restrictive to do nothing
than to do something."'8 8
183.

U.S. v. Playboy Ent. Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
184. Cohen, 403 U.S. 205, 210-211 (1971).
185. Compare Playboy Ent. Group, 529 U.S. at 814; with Ashcroft 11, 124 S. Ct. at 2798
(Breyer, J. dissenting) (stating "the term 'less restrictive alternative' is a comparative term.
An alternative is 'less restrictive' only if it will work less First Amendment harm than the
statute itself, while at the same time similarly furthering the 'compelling' interest that
prompted Congress to enact the statute").
186. Sable, 529 U.S. at 126. (stating content-based speech restrictions are Constitutional only if they satisfy strict scrutiny); see also R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382
(1992) (stating that content-based restrictions are presumptively invalid).
187. Ashcroft 1I, 124 S. Ct. at 2801-2802 (Breyer, J. dissenting) ("Conceptually speaking, the presence of filtering software is not an alternativelegislative approach to the problem of protecting children from exposure to commercial pornography. Rather, it is part of
the status quo .... It is always true, by definition, that the status quo is less restrictive
than a new regulatory law").
188. Id. at 2802.
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That filtering software was found to be "at least as successful as
COPA would be in restricting minors' access to harmful material online
without imposing the burden on speech that COPA impos[ed] on adult
users or Web site operators," was the non-conforming link in Congress'
chain resulting in COPA's likely demise.' 8 9 What makes the suggested
National Anti-Porn I.P. Registry as well as the National Anti-Porn
Cookie better than COPA's age verification requirement and, in the alternative, filtering software, is the ease with which such systems could
be put in place without placing too heavy a burden on Internet content
providers or adult users. 190
Both alternatives are already in use to some extent. 19 1 Meaning
that Internet content providers would have little to no cost involved in
coming into accord with either of the alternatives. 1 9 2 Furthermore, with
respect to adult users, the ability to access such content is completely
within their personal discretion in either of the above suggested alternative systems. There is no concern about embarrassment, 1 9 3 or the inability to verify one's age because of a lack of a credit card or debit
account. 19 4 By removing age verification requirements, and placing the
onus on individual home users with respect to opting out of access to
sexually explicit content, there is likewise no need to be concerned that
minors that have credit cards or debit accounts would be able to access
195
Web sites falling under the purview of the above suggested statutes.
189. Id. at 2790.
190. See Microsoft, supra n. 161 (reflecting that I.P. blocking by Internet domains is
already a viable technology); see also How Stuff Works, supra n. 164 (stating that Internet
Cookies are widely used and recognized as helpful to both Internet users as well as Internet content providers).
191. See Microsoft, supra n. 161; see also How Stuff Works, supra n. 164.
192. See Am. Civil Lib. Union v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 488 (recognizing that the age
verification requirements would have created too heavy a burden on Internet content providers for a multitude of reasons. Several steps would be required under any of the accepted
age verification means. A Web site operator would be required to set up a merchant account, retain the services of an Internet-based credit card clearing house, insert a multitude of complicated software to process user information, potentially rearrange the Web
site's content, store credit card numbers or passwords in a database, and obtain a secure
server to transmit consumers' credit card or other verification information. All in all, the
cost of such a credit card verification system could initially cost anywhere from $300 plus
per transaction costs to thousands of dollars plus transaction costs).
193. U.S. v. Am. Lib. Assn., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d at 411 (showing the District Court
found problematic that adult patrons may be too embarrassed to ask librarians to unblock
certain Web sites thus restricting their access to speech they would otherwise be entitled to
access).
194. Reno, 521 U.S. at 856 (stating the imposition of requiring a credit card or debit
account to access blocked content would create an impermissible burden on speech to those
adults that do not have either a credit card or debit account).
195. Id. at 857.
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In Ashcroft H, filtering software was found to be less restrictive than
COPA's age verification requirements because "[the age verification requirements] impos[ed] selective restrictions at the receiving end, not universal restrictions at the source." 196 The posited alternatives to filtering
software, the National Anti-Porn I.P. Registry and National Anti-Porn
Cookie, are likewise implemented at the receiving end of the content.
While there would be some minimal requirements on Internet content
providers to update their software to recognize both the Cookie or the
I.P. addresses, the majority of the weight is on individual home users to
affirmatively state, much like a consumer utilizing the NDNCR, "I do not
want access to your Web site's content."
Equally important to the personal choice to opt out of being able to
access sexually explicit content that falls under the purview of the above
suggested statutes, is the fact that neither the National Anti-Porn I.P.
Registry, nor the National Anti-Porn Cookie, fall prey to the inevitable
tendency of filtering software to be duped by savvy Internet
pornographers using creative techniques to get around the filtering
software's criteria (underblocking) or the inevitable tendency of filtering
software to be too restrictive in its criteria (overblocking).1 97 At present,
filtering software is also unable to screen Web sites for sexually explicit
images. 198 The above suggested alternatives would not fall prey to similar concerns because Internet content providers would be required to automatically, based on the definitions in the controlling statute, block out
the I.P. addresses in the registry or computers that have downloaded the
cookie. Furthermore, neither the National Anti-Porn I.P. Registry, nor
the National Anti-Porn Cookie, would cost an Internet user any money
whereas the average filtering software package costs approximately
$40.199

The National Anti-Porn I.P. Registry as well as the National AntiPorn Cookie, however, both have their weaknesses. Since Congress can
only regulate that content which falls under its jurisdiction, internationally based Web sites with sexually explicit content will still be accessible
196. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2792.
197. Christine Peterson, FilteringSoftware: Regular or Decaf, http://www.txla.org/pubs/
tlj-1q97/filters.html (accessed Nov. 1, 2004). Filtering software is that "which blocks, filters, or monitors Internet use." Id. Filtering software, in order to block out content, uses
lists created by either the vendor of the software, the consumer of the software, or both. Id.
Filtering software works in several ways. Id. "Filtering by phrase" is one way filtering
software blocks unwanted content. Id. Typically a vendor of the software provides an initial list that is modifiable by the consumer once the software has been installed on the
consumer's computer. Id. Another way in which filtering software blocks out unwanted
content is by domain name. In this case the filtering software comes with a list of domain
names that are automatically blocked based on the vendor's judgment. Id.
198. Reno, 521 U.S. at 855 (quoting Reno v. Am. Civ. Lib. Union, 929 F.Supp. at 842)
199. Am. Civil Lib. Union v. Reno, 31 F.Supp.2d at 492.
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to minors via the Internet regardless of their home computer's status
with respect to either of the suggested alternatives to filtering
software. 20 0 Filtering software's capabilities, however, extend beyond
the reach ofjurisdictional borders. 20 1 This fact should not be determinative of Congress' ability to regulate that material which it does have jurisdiction over. Either of the two suggested alternatives are as effective
as filtering software, if not more so, because Internet content providers
falling under the purview of the controlling statute will be deterred from
ignoring consumers' affirmative choice to opt out of being able to access
sexually explicit content due to the stiff penalties that would apply to
such an abridgement. It is important to note that the alternatives suggested herein do not censor speech, they only require Internet content
providers falling under the guise of either alternative to simply avoid
allowing access to any person(s) affirmatively stating so.
Either of the above two suggested alternatives to filtering software
are capable of withstanding strict scrutiny under the First Amendment's
free speech protections. Although they are content-based restrictions,
20 2
their definitional standards have been upheld by the Supreme Court.
Furthermore, although filtering software is technically less restrictive in
that it maintains the status quo, to continually limit Congress' ability to
regulate speech on the Internet in the way that the Supreme Court has
been is detrimental to the "'constructive discourse between our courts
and legislatures' that 'is an integral and admirable part of the constitutional design,' ' 20 3 and will continue to be so until the Court one way or
another lays down a hard and fast decision with respect to regulation of
speech on the Internet.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Congress has tried and tried and tried again to enact legislation capable of regulating minors' access to sexually explicit, harmful material
accessible via the Internet. While the Court has continued to strike
down virtually every content-based restriction Congress has enacted,
with each new attempt by a very persistent legislature the statutes have
gotten closer to acceptance by the Court as constitutionally sound. Congress attempted to cut a wide swath through the pornographic jungle
that is flourishing on the Internet with the CDA. This first attempt,
while constitutionally deficient provided the basis for COPA which sur200. Ashcroft 11, 124 S. Ct. at 2792 (stating COPA's age verification requirements were
not enforceable against internationally based Web sites, therefore, the similar language
utilized in the suggested alternatives to filtering software would likewise be
unenforceable).
201. Id.
202. Ashcroft 1, 535 U.S. at 585.
203. Ashcroft 11, 124 S. Ct. at 2804 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
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vived strict scrutiny with respect to its definitional language establishing the limits of Congress' reach.
Although the death knell for COPA was likely rung when the Court
held that the age verification requirements contained within COPA were
not the least restrictive means of achieving Congress' stated goal of protecting minors from the harmful effects of exposure to sexually explicit
material during their tender, impressionable years, the decision did not
totally remove all hope for COPA supporters. Currently available technology gives both parents and Congress options with respect to safeguarding the nation's personal computers from access to pornography via
the Internet if individual users so choose.
The status quo allows such individual users to purchase filtering
software, the effectiveness of which is better than no safeguards at all.
Under the recent decisions, it is not outside the realm of possibility that
Congress may be able to enact other systems whereby Internet content
providers are required to refuse their sites' access to users who affirmatively request to so be refused. As this Comment suggests, there are already at least two technologically feasible means to accomplish such
regulation. Based on, and inspired by the NDNCR, both the National
Anti-Porn I.P. Registry as well as the National Anti-Porn Cookie have
the potential to be effective means in the struggle against the damaging
effects that exposure to sexually explicit material has on minors.
Regulation of sexually explicit content available on the Internet has
proved to be especially troublesome for both the Congress as well as the
Supreme Court to get a grasp on. The near future will likely continue to
perpetuate inconsistent decisions from the Court with respect to this issue. Seemingly, the technology is still in a state whereby the Court is
unsure exactly as to how it should handle such sensitive issues as the
regulation of material that is harmful to minors, accessible via the
Internet.
As of yet the Court has not established that Congress is completely
without the ability to regulate sexually explicit Internet content, although some believe the decisions of late suggest that the Court may in
fact be reaching that point. 20 4 On the other hand, supporters of COPA
have celebrated in the fact that the Court held COPA to not be facially
invalid. 20 5 About all that is clear at this point in the debate is that the

204. See Ronald Patrick Reid, Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 7 T.G. Jones
L. Rev. 95, 110 (suggesting the Court will ultimately extend the First Amendment's protections to obscene speech nullifying Congress' ability to regulate any form of sexually explicit
material available on the Internet or otherwise).
205. McAffee, supra n. 64, at 167.
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Court has not reached a consensus on how it is going to treat regulation
of speech on the Internet, and the debate will continue until they do.
Jacob A. Sosnayt
t The author is a second year, first semester law student at The John Marshall Law
School in Chicago, IL. He would like to thank Professor Walter Kendall III who inspired
the idea for this Comment. Drink Pepsi®.
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